As of March 10, 2025, Syria stands at a crossroads, its political landscape irrevocably altered by the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. The group that spearheaded this seismic shift, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), now governs the country under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Julani. While the ousting of Assad was initially met with cautious optimism in some quarters, the rapid consolidation of power by HTS—a group with deep historical ties to Al-Qaeda—has sparked widespread concern. Reports of massacres, sectarian violence, and the persistence of jihadist ideology have cast a dark shadow over Syria’s future. This blog post delves into the origins of HTS, al-Julani’s ties to Al-Qaeda, the recent violent upheavals, and what this means for Syria and the region.
Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Julani)?
Ahmed al-Sharaa, now Syria’s interim president, is a figure whose past is steeped in militancy. Born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a Syrian family, al-Julani moved to Syria as a child and later became radicalized during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. He joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, fighting against American forces. After Zarqawi’s death in 2006, al-Julani continued his jihadist career, eventually aligning with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would later lead the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).
In 2011, as the Syrian civil war erupted, al-Baghdadi dispatched al-Julani to Syria to establish an Al-Qaeda branch. This became Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front), which quickly gained notoriety for its brutal tactics, including suicide bombings and targeting civilians. Between 2011 and 2012, al-Julani coordinated closely with ISI, leveraging its resources to expand Al-Qaeda’s foothold in Syria. However, tensions arose in 2013 when al-Baghdadi sought to merge Nusra with ISI to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al-Julani rejected this merger, pledging loyalty instead to Al-Qaeda’s central leadership under Ayman al-Zawahiri. This split marked a pivotal moment, setting Nusra on a distinct path.
In 2016, al-Julani announced Nusra’s formal dissociation from Al-Qaeda, rebranding it as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This move was widely seen as a pragmatic attempt to shed the Al-Qaeda label, gain legitimacy among Syrian rebels, and attract broader support. In 2017, through a series of mergers with other factions, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham evolved into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with al-Julani at its helm. The U.S., however, was unconvinced by this rebranding, designating HTS a terrorist organization in 2018 due to its Al-Qaeda lineage and extremist activities.
HTS’s Takeover of Syria
HTS’s rise to power culminated in a lightning offensive in late 2024, which toppled Assad’s regime in just weeks. Backed by Turkey and, some allege, tacit Western approval, HTS swept from its stronghold in Idlib to Damascus, ending over five decades of Assad family rule. Al-Julani, once a shadowy militant, emerged as Syria’s interim president, promising a new era of inclusivity and stability. Yet, his past and HTS’s actions tell a more complex story.
Turkey’s role in HTS’s success cannot be overstated. Ankara provided logistical support, including drones and border access, allowing HTS to outmaneuver Assad’s forces. Posts on X and various analyses suggest Western intelligence may have turned a blind eye, viewing HTS as a lesser evil compared to Assad or ISIS. This pragmatic alliance, however, has raised questions about the long-term implications of empowering a group with jihadist roots.
Al-Julani’s Ties to Al-Qaeda: A Persistent Shadow
Al-Julani’s ties to Al-Qaeda are not a distant memory but a foundational element of his career. As leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, he oversaw operations that aligned with Al-Qaeda’s global jihadist agenda, including attacks on civilians and sectarian violence against minorities. His 2015 rhetoric, urging retaliatory strikes on Alawite villages in Latakia, underscored his sectarian bent. Even after the 2016 split, analysts debate whether this was a genuine ideological shift or a strategic maneuver.
HTS under al-Julani has ruled Idlib since 2017, imposing a quasi-caliphate that extorted over $1 billion in taxes and crushed dissent. While HTS has distanced itself from Al-Qaeda’s transnational ambitions, focusing instead on Syrian governance, its governance model retains echoes of its extremist past—strict Islamic law, suppression of opposition, and reliance on foreign fighters. Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz has called al-Julani an “al-Qaeda terrorist,” a sentiment echoed by critics who point to HTS’s brutal enforcement of power.
Escalating Violence: Massacres and Sectarian Strife
Since Assad’s fall, Syria has descended into chaos, with HTS’s rule tested by escalating violence. In early March 2025, clashes erupted in the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartous—former Assad strongholds dominated by the Alawite sect, to which Assad belonged. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reports that over 1,000 people, including 830 civilians, have been killed since March 6, with many deaths attributed to summary executions and revenge killings targeting Alawites.
The violence began when pro-Assad Alawite gunmen ambushed HTS security forces, seizing control of areas like Qardaha, Assad’s hometown. HTS responded with a brutal crackdown, deploying reinforcements from Idlib, Aleppo, and Homs. Reports indicate that government-aligned forces executed at least 90 Alawites in reprisal, with allegations of massacres extending to Christians and Druze minorities. Social media posts on X claim churches have been bombed and crosses destroyed, though these remain unverified.
Al-Julani has blamed pro-Assad remnants for inciting sectarian strife, vowing to punish perpetrators—even his own allies—through newly formed investigative committees. Yet, his promises of accountability ring hollow to many. The SOHR and other monitors describe the killings as systematic, with bodies piling up in streets and mass graves uncovered near Qardaha. Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon has called the violence “extremely dangerous,” accusing HTS of failing to control its forces.
The Alawite Question and Minority Fears
The Alawites, comprising about 10% of Syria’s population, have long been tied to Assad’s regime, though many distanced themselves from his rule. HTS’s rise has deepened their fears, given al-Julani’s history of targeting their communities. The recent massacres have only amplified these concerns, with reports suggesting HTS views Alawites as “remnants of Assad’s regime” ripe for retribution.
Other minorities—Christians, Druze, and Kurds—also face uncertainty. Christians, whose numbers have plummeted from 200,000 to 30,000 since the war began, report targeted killings. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), controlling Syria’s oil-rich northeast, have clashed with Turkish-backed groups allied to HTS, complicating al-Julani’s efforts to unify the country. Despite his pledges of inclusivity, the reality on the ground suggests a Sunni Islamist dominance that threatens Syria’s diverse mosaic.
International Reactions and Uncertain Future
The international community is divided. Europe has cautiously engaged with HTS, easing sanctions on Damascus, while the U.S. continues airstrikes on residual Al-Qaeda affiliates like Hurras al-Din, signaling skepticism about HTS’s transformation. At the UN, the U.S. and Russia have called for emergency talks on the violence, reflecting global alarm.
Al-Julani’s interim government, set to transition by March 1, 2025 (now overdue), faces immense challenges: a shattered economy, territorial fragmentation, and Israel’s looming threat, backed by airstrikes and incursions. He ties security and prosperity to lifting U.S. sanctions, but with no direct contact from the Trump administration, his Al-Qaeda past remains a sticking point.
Conclusion: A New Syria or a Jihadist Redux?
HTS’s takeover, led by a man once pledged to Al-Qaeda, is a double-edged sword. It ended Assad’s tyranny but risks replacing it with a new form of authoritarianism. The massacres of Alawites and minorities, coupled with HTS’s jihadist legacy, challenge al-Julani’s narrative of moderation. As Syria teeters on the brink, the world watches—some with hope, others with dread—to see whether this is a genuine break from the past or a rehash of old horrors under a new banner. For now, the blood on Syria’s coast speaks louder than al-Julani’s promises.
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